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A strategic interdiction campaign against the logistics supply system of an
enemy may take many forms: it may consist of attacks on the key installations such
as military industrial bases, supply depots, or attacks on the vital links between these
installations and the front-line troops in the battlefield. The key installations are
normally well protected through hardening and the deployment of air defenses and
troops. Compared to the installations, the land transportation network, as it traverses
through a large expense of territories, is harder to protect against concerted and
determined efforts by the air, naval and land forces.
A. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to develop models for the optimum allocation of
multiple types of strike resources to interdict a land transportation network in order
to degrade the performance of an enemy's logistics supply system. In particular, we
will be formulating mathematical programs for the strikes against single commodity
and multicommodity networks.
B. OVERVIEW
Strategic strike is a complex task for the Armed Services to undertake. It
involves the setting of campaign goals, development of attack plans and coordinated
execution by the participating strike forces.
1. Types of Strike assets
The resources available to the operational planners at the command
headquarters for the interdiction campaign consist of:
a. Air power such as a fleet of fighter aircraft and attack helicopters,
b. Naval gunfire support,
c. Special forces trained for deep strike, sabotage and reconnaissance
missions, and,
d. Long range missiles launched from land, air and sea platforms.
In developing a campaign plan, the strike planner would estimate the weapons efforts
required to interdict the targets based on a desired confidence level of mission
success. The available strike assets should then matched in an optimum manner to
the targets according to the weapon suitability and economy of efforts, which in turn
depend on a host of factors such as the ease of target detection and identification,
enemy defenses, target vulnerability, the potential collateral damages.
2. Campaign Objectives
The central task of the strike planner is the optimum allocation of the
multi-dimensional forces to interdict the following types of networks:
a. Single Commodity Network . To degrade the performance of a road
network, a viable strategy is one of counter-capacity. The aim is to
minimize the throughput of network by allocating a fixed amount of
resources to interdict the most "profitable" arcs. Another approach
is to minimize the demands of the front-line units, or the demands
prioritized according to geographical locations. Yet another type of
single commodity network is one faced in an unconventional warfare
setting. Here, the enemy attempts to infiltrate through the network
by avoiding detection; arc capacity is not a factor. The aim of the
strike planner is to minimize the probability of enemy infiltration,
b. Multicommodity Network . The attacker would want to reduce as
much as possible the weighted flow of multiple commodities from
certain nodes in the supply network to other nodes.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
The network interdiction problem has been studied for quite some time now.
There are two common approaches to modelling the problem; either a deterministic
model or stochastic / game theoretic model.
Mustin and McMasters 1967 develop an algorithm for optimally interdicting a
transportation network using limited assets. They consider a model in which the
capacity of an arc (/,/) can be reduced by one unit by the expenditure of e,y units of
resources. The objective is to minimize the maximum flow obtainable between two
nodes s and t subject to the consumption of no more than E units of resources.
Their methodology requires that the network be planar so that the topological dual
can be taken for the enumeration of many cut-sets. This is an undesirable
requirement. The source-sink planar graph requires not only planarity but also
requires that the source and the sink lie on the outer face of the graph, which is
quite a strong assumption. Furthermore, the algorithm is not easy to generalize to
handle multiple resources with which to interdict arcs, or multiple resources which
must be applied together to interdict an arc.
Nugent and McMasters 1969 develop an embellished version of the above
model in that the damage function is now assumed to be exponential. Associated
with each arc (/J), there is a measure of vulnerability biy The proportional reduction
in the arc capacity with e^ units of resources allocated is {1 - exp(-by€
y)}.
The object
is to maximize the reduction in the maximum flow. The algorithm also requires the
topological dual of the network to be taken, so that the "shortest" routes, which
represent minimum capacity cut-sets in the primal network, can be determined.
Since the damage function is now exponential, the allocation of weapons in one cut-
set is determined using a Lagrangian method. The algorithm always produces
non-integer solutions. This model suffers the same weaknesses as the previous
model. The method of taking a topological dual and enumerating cut-sets is
inefficient if the network becomes too large.
Wollmer 1970 presents two algorithms for targeting strikes against a network.
The enemy is assumed to have the policy of either maximizing flow between a source
node s and a sink node t or meeting a given flow at minimum cost. For his first
algorithm, the cost of traversing arc (/,/) is assumed to be a linear function of flow.
After the arc has been struck, there is a resulting cost increase per unit time Ac of
a minimum cost circulation flow and repair time t*. Associated with each arc, there
is a strike value v
tj which is defined as the repair cost kLi plus t^Lc. The model is a
one-strike algorithm in that, at any one time, only one arc which is that arc with the
maximum strike value will be interdicted. Multiple strikes are approximated by
repeated applications of the same algorithm. The second algorithm treats the arc
costs as piece-wise linear functions with one break point. Wollmer's algorithms do
not produce optimal results in a multiple strike scenario.
Capps and Taylor 1970 develop a model similar to the above model. The
damage function is now assumed to be exponential. Against an arc (/,/) with a
vulnerability measure by, the proportional reduction in capacity d^ due to e
tj units of
effort is (l-esxp{6«e^}). The arc repair time U and repair cost ta are assumed in turn
to be linear functions of d,j. As in Wollmer's model, this model selects and
interdicts the arc with the maximum strike value which is the sum of k„- and t^Lc.
The model allows for arc repairs and allocates the resources on a daily basis. This
model suffers the same weaknesses as the previous model.
Preston and Howard 1970 develop a procedure for determining the optimum
allocation of aircraft against a transportation network system using the technique of
dynamic programming. An exponential relationship between arc capacity and
interdiction effort is assumed. The model requires a topological dual of the network
to be constructed and a range of cut-sets enumerated. The minimum capacity for
each level of available resourcesE = 1,2,3,... is determined by dynamic programming.
The algorithm will increase the value of E until either the maximum value of E is
reached or when the benefit to be gained from assigning the last aircraft is less than
the cost of assigning the aircraft. The model entails the enumeration of many cut-
sets and does so for a large number of E. It is also rather difficult to produce for a
particular war-time scenario a reasonable estimate on the cost of assigning one
aircraft and the benefit of each mission.
Helmbold 1971 develops a model for the allocation of limited strike assets
among the arcs of a transportation network by analyzing its topological dual. The
damage function is assumed to be a step function. A particular arc (/,/) would have
its capacity cJtj reduced to a lower level of capacity c2ij by an interdiction effort e«.
The optimum allocation of strike assets to the arcs in a cut-set is solved by dynamic-
programming. He claims that the algorithm can be extended to handle the problem
of multiple resources, but this would be possible only in a limited way. Furthermore,
the model is again restricted to planar networks.
Ghare, Montgomery and Turner 1971 develop a branch and bound algorithm
for the interdiction of a set of arcs in order to minimize the maximum flow of a
network subject to fixed amount of resources. For each arc (/,/) with capacity c«, its
destruction requires e
t
i units of resource; no partial destruction of an arc is allowed.
The model computes the lower bounds on the maximum flow once an arc is
destroyed, which affects the decision whether to include or exclude a particular arc
from the branching procedure. This choice of lower bound for the branch and bound
procedure is not ideal. As a whole, this model is based on a rather weak
characterization of an interdicted network, and would be difficult to implement, for
instance, with multiple strike resources.
Wollmer 1968 develops a non-deterministic model for determining where to
place interdicting forces in order to maximize the probability of preventing an
opposing force (the evader) from proceeding from one node in a network to another.
The interdictor determines a probability 7^ of placing a single interceptor on arc (/,/)
given a known probability ofptj of stopping a single evader traversing the arc given
that the evader is traversing the arc. The aim of the single evader is, knowing the
interdictor's strategy, to pick a path which maximizes the probability of successful
traversal through the network. For a small network, this problem can be analyzed
in terms of a two person zero-sum game which can be easily solved by linear
programming. For a large network, the game matrix becomes too large to handle.
Wollmer therefore proposes a solution technique which is based on marginal analysis
or the steepest ascent approach. Initially, all values of ii
i}
are set to zero and are
incremented in such a way that the ratio of the increase in tt^ and the decrease in K
is minimized. Without any formal proof, he claims that the solution is exact for a
scenario of a single interceptor versus a single evader and yields an approximately
optimal answer for multiple interceptors. The main weakness of the model is its
inability to handle multiple infiltrators traversing the network simultaneously. The
optimal strategy of the evader is also not given in the model.
Danskin 1962 develops a game theory model of convoy routing. The analysis
solves a two-person zero-sum game in which one player, the convoy command, directs
two routes; the first represented by a vector x for the merchant vessels and the
second by a vector y for escorts. The other player, the enemy submarine command,
controls one vector z. The payoff P, in terms of tonnage delivered / dollar cost, is
defined as the ratio of T the total tonnage delivered on a set of routes and C the
total route cost including the cost of losses. The convoy commander seeks to
maximize P which is a function of (x, y, z) whilst the submarine commander seeks
to minimize P. The model determines a critical turnaround time a using a
Lagrangian method. If a route i has its turnaround time a
t
> a^ it is not used. If a
t
< do, it is used. The main difficulty of this model, when applied to network
interdiction problem, is that the determination of a and other threshold values would
require the solving of equations involving the sum of non-linear functions of 7, and
C, over all paths through the network.
D. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions made for the development of the various model throughout
this paper are as follows:
a. Damage function . It is assumed that there would be no partial
destruction of a target. The capacity of an arc will be reduced to zero
upon interdiction, which is a reasonable assumption with the advent of
"smart" weapons. Other types of damage functions may approximated by
expanding arcs into sets of independent parallel arcs.
b. Time frame . We are assuming that once the link is destroyed, the arc
capacity is reduced instantaneously to zero. The enemy could employ
other support means, such as constructing pontoon bridges next to the
destroyed bridges, but this would take some time.
c. Independent Arc . It is assumed that the destruction of one arc has no
impact on the performance of other arcs in the network.
e. Node Capacities . We assume that each node will have infinite capacity.
If interdiction of a node, say a road intersection, is a possibility, this can
be accomplished by splitting the node i into two nodes i1 and i2 and
connecting a capacitated arc between these two nodes. In the case of a
directed network, all arcs originally entering node i now enter node i2 and
all arcs leaving node i now leave i2 . The model can also be generalized
to undirected networks.
II. DETERMINISTIC MODELS - SINGLE COMMODITY NETWORKS
In this chapter, integer programs are formulated for the interdiction of a single
commodity network. The aims of the attacker are to reduce to the maximum flow
of materials, minimize the resource used to cut off all supplies to the enemy and
minimize the maximum flow of supplies to the units, prioritized according to their
tactical values. Most of the models discussed here are generalizations of those
described in Wood 1991.
A. NETWORK FLOW BASICS
Let G = (N^4) be a directed graph with node set N and arc set A. An arc is
an ordered pair (/,/) where /,/ e N. Associated with each arc (/,/), there is a flow
capacity w«. The lower bound of arc capacity is assumed to be zero. Let / be the
amount of flow in the network from the source node s to sink node t. The maximum
flow problem can be stated as:
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Maximize / (1.1)
Subject to x :: -
f if i =5
Z x, -
J
if / t s or t
if i = t




where the sums and inequalities are taken over existing arcs in the network.
Let S be any set of nodes in the network such that S contains node s but not
t. \etT = N - S. Then (5,7) = {(/,;) : i e S, j e T} is a cut-set separating node s from
node t.





a. - fy*o v (/,/)
^>o v (iV)
a. unrestricted V i
(1.2)
where a is the dual variable corresponding to the conservation equations and /? is the
dual variable corresponding to x < u.
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In the single commodity flow problem, it is well known from the Maximum-
flow/minimum-cut theorem by Ford and Fulkerson that, for a given maximum flow
/, a cut (S,T) is minimal if, and only if all the arcs of (S,T) are saturated while the
arcs in the form (T,S) are flowless with respect to/. Hence, we are guaranteed an
integer optimal solution if the arc capacities are integer. This also arises from the
fact that the constraint matrix of the maximum flow problem is unimodular. We
shall now develop a constructive proof for the following lemma:
LEMMA 1 The dual of the maximum flow problem has a solution in which all dual
variables are or 1.
Assume that G is connected and that we have solved the maximum flow
problem using a bounded-variable simplex algorithm as in Bradley, Brown and
Graves 1977. However, instead of starting with a full artificial basis, assume that full
rank has been achieved by discarding the last flow-balance constraint in the
maximum flow problem. This implies that aNt = 0. Now, any basis which is
associated with the flow balance constraints from a network flow problem can be put
into the upper triangular form. Let B be the optimal basis in triangulated form and
assume that variables have been reflected about their upper bounds as necessary to
put all + Is on the diagonal of B. Reflection does not change the dual solution. Let
a denote the dual row vector of length \N\ - 1 and let cB denote the row vector of
length 1/vl - 1 containing the costs associated with the optimal basis. If cB = it
12
follows that a = 0. If not, cB = (000...010...0) where the 1 is in position / say, and
a can be computed from
aB = cB
Now Ba = 1, and we let p(z') < i denote the row of the off-diagonal element in
column i of B. If there is no off-diagonal element p(i) = and we define a = 0.




as - a (2)




= since a =...= a
7.2 = andp(7-l) < / - 2
a/ " QP (i) = 1 =* Qf/ = 1 since a =...= aw = and/?(7) < / - 1
<*/+; " Op(/+7> = * <*/+/ = 1 if <*P(i+i)
= 1 or => a/+; = if ap(l+1) =
aM; " <*P(Nm = ° =* aMi = 1 if OpfMi; = 1 or * aM1 = if ap(M^ =
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Thus, a, = or a, = 1 for all i e N. Next, for a specified arc (/,;') note that (a) frj >
0, (b) Pjj appears in only one inequality in the dual formulation (1.2), and (c) the
objective coefficient u^ associated with ^ is positive. It therefore follows that
1. if a, = and a, = 0, then
tj
= 0,
2. if a- = 1 and a
}
= 0, then ${j = 0,
3. if a, = and a, = 1, then fig = 1, and
4. if a, = 1 and ol
}
= 1, then $l} = 0.
Thus, the dual of the maximum flow problem has an optimum solution in which all
dual variables are or 1. QED
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B. MINIMIZE MAXIMUM FLOW
1. Problem Statement
The logistics planner of an enemy wishes to force through as much of a
single commodity from a source node to a sink node in a directed and capacitated
network. Given insufficient resources to completely cut the supply network, the
problem of the interdictor will be to minimize the maximum amount of flow that the
enemy can force through the unbroken arcs. The strike planner can allocate any one
type of resource available to interdict any one arc. Simultaneous strikes by multiple
resources on a single target are not necessary. (This model can be generalized to
include a co-ordinated attack of multiple strike resources against a single target.)
Destruction of an arc is always assumed to be total.
2. Model 1 - Network with Directed Arcs
For an interdicted network model, the indices used are:
/,/ : nodes,
/ : the type of strike resources available, e.g., cruise missiles, aircraft,
special forces, etc.
The data of the model are:
e{ji : amount resource of type / required to destroy arc (/,;')
E
l
: the total strike assets available for resource type /,
w, : the capacity of arc (i,j).
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The decision variables are:
y^ : the binary variable which is 1 if arc (*,/) is destroyed by resource type
/, and is otherwise 0,
x
tj : flow through arc (i,j),
/ : total flow through the network.














l tjl e (0,1)
(2.1)
if i = s
if i # s or t





v (/,/) , /
where r = {7„7 I T« c (0,1) V (/,/) , / and £ evy9 <E,Vl)
U,j)
ijlUjl
The second constraint of (2.1) ensures that the capacity of arc (/,/) is reduced
to zero once y«/ is equal to one. The solution of the Min-Max problem will yield an
optimum solution corresponding to the maximum flow given that the total resources
E are insufficient to reduce the capacity of any cut-set (S,T) in the network to zero.
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To solve the above Min-Max problem, we can take the dual of the minimization









*j + tit* * o
h >- o V (i J) , /
a, unrestricted V i
r - { T« I 7* e (0,1) V (/,/) , / , and E eijt y tjl < Et V / }
where a is the dual variable associated with the flow conservation constraint and /J
is the dual variable associated with the second constraint of (2.1).
Now, let
Substituting the above into the second constraint of the (2.2), we have,
a. - a. + E/^, + £7^ >
17
The second constraint of (2.2) is now non-linear. However, we can prove that,
or
,
From Lemma 1, we know that for fixed values of 7,^ the optimum solution of
the inner minimization problem has /L, equal to or 1. This is true since, for fixed
yijh problem (2.1) is just a maximum flow problem with multiple upper bounds on
each arc and such a problem can be solved by throwing out all bounds but the
smallest. (Throwing out a bound sets some /^7 to 0.) Let/? be the event { 7,^ = 0},
and q be the event { |8,-.7 = 1}. Equation (2.3) is true \ip or q is true. It is false, if
and only if both p and q are false, i.e., only when { 7y/ =1} and { /?y/ = 0}. Looking
back at the objective function of (2.2), if { /Jy/ = 0} we may assume that { 7,^ = 0}
because setting 7^ = 1 would not affect the value of the objective function but it
would unnecessarily use up e
t}l
units of resources. Therefore, we may linearize the
second constraint of (2.2) by replacing the non-linear term 7y//?,;/ with 7y/ and the
constraint becomes:




We now have the following mixed integer program (MIP):








tt - a- + £/i«, + E7« > V (/,/)
i i
£ W* ± Ei * l
h
tjl
> V (/,/) , /
Tp« (0,1) V(iJ) ,/
a. unrestricted V z
Since, for this model, we will select at the most one type of resource to interdict
one particular arc, we have for each arc (/,/), E/y,y, < 1. In an arc (/,/) in a cut-set,
there may be at most 1 of y^ terms taking on the value of 1. Hence, E, h ijt can be
replaced by a single term hu.
19
The final formulation becomes:








a . _ tt . + fc„ + £T^ > o V (/,/)
('J)
*, > V (ij)
7 y/ e (0,1) V(iJ) , /
or. unrestricted V /
We can interpret the above model as being based on a modified dual of the
maximum flow linear programming formulation. Essentially, an (S,T) cut has been
identified with all a, = 1 for i e T and a, = for i e S. The value of E/y^ = 1 if (/,;")
is a forward arc across the cut and that arc is to be broken; hu is 1 if (/,/) is a forward
arc across the cut but that arc is not to be broken; and all other h^ and E/ita are 0.
Thus, we see that a cut is identified and arcs are broken in that cut so as to leave as
little remaining capacity as possible.
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3. Model 2 - Network with Undirected Arcs
If the network G' = ( N, A') is undirected, we would have to convert G" into
an appropriate directed graph in order to use Model 1. In the maximum flow
problem, no flow need enter the source nodes and no flow need leave the sink nodes
so that any arc incident to a source node can be represented by a single arc directed
out from the source node and any arc incident to a sink node can be represented by
a single arc directed into the sink node. Other undirected arcs in G' can be replaced
by two independent directed arcs in anti-parallel, each directed arc with the capacity
Uu and resource e
t
: taken from the original network G. If one of the two directed
arcs in the anti-parallel pair is destroyed, there is no possibility of the other arc being
interdicted simultaneously requiring a total of 2e,j units of resource to destroy the
undirected arc. Specifically, if one directed arc (/,/) is destroyed, we have a, = and
a. = 1. This means that, for the other directed arc (/,/), the term {h tj + £//,-«} will
be zero without violating the second constraint of (2.5).
Model 1 can solve the problem of undirected graph using the above
transformation, but introduces a large number of variables as it does not take
advantage of the fact that each pair of directed arcs share the same values of
capacity and destruction effort. Denote an undirected arc as an unordered pair of
nodes [/,/]
21













1 tjl < (0,1) V [ij] ,1
a unrestricted V i
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C. MINIMIZE INTERDICTION EFFORT
1. Problem Statement
The attacker has sufficient resources E to stop completely the flow of
material in the supply network. The time taken for force projection to arc (/,/) and
recovery of resource type / back to base depends on a factor wijt . The aim of the
interdictor is to destroy the set of arcs so as to cut the network into two disjoint
subsets utilizing minimum resource and assigning the missions in such a way which
minimizes the maximum mission turnaround time.
2. Model 3 - Network with Directed Arcs
When the interdictor has only one type of resource, the minimum resource
required to reducing the network flow to zero and the associated cut-set can be
determined by solving a maximum flow problem with the arc capacities equal to the
interdiction efforts. The minimal capacity cut-set of the maximum flow problem
yields the results of the total minimum resource and the set of arcs to be interdicted.
To solve the problem of multiple resources, we need to introduce the following
modifications to Model 1:
a. Delete all terms with h^ as there is now zero network flow,
b. Introduce a conversion factor w^ for each resource type /; the conversion
factor being the measure of the mission turnaround time and of how the strike
23
planners value the opportunity cost of a particular resource availability. The
formulation becomes:









. + E itjl > V (ij)
V /
7 y/ e (0,1) V(iJ) ,/
a unrestricted V i
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3. Model 4 - Network with Undirected Arcs
For an undirected network, let an undirected arc be represented by a pair of
nodes [/,/], the formulation is as follows:










tt. - a. + E 7 yV > V [i,j]
E e. 7y7 < E, Ml
[ij]
ly* (0,1) V [/,/] ,/
a. unrestricted V i
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D. MAXIMIZE SHORTFALL IN PRIORITIZED DEMAND
1. Problem Statement
The enemy wants to push through a road network sufficient flow of
materials from a set of depots I
s
to meet the demands of the field units, especially
of those tactically crucial units Id which are in critical shortage of supplies. The
problem of the attacker is to select a set of arcs with a fixed resource E in order to




2. Model 5 - Network with Directed Arcs
In this model the additional notation used is:
I
s
: the set of supply nodes,
Id : the set of demand nodes,
I : the set of transhipment nodes.
The additional data required is:
Si : the amount of supply at node /,
d
{
: the amount of demand at node /,
r
t
: the tactical values of units; the higher the value of the unit the
greater is its tactical importance,
The additional variables introduced here are:
y,
+
: the amount of unused supply at supply node /,
26
yf : the amount of shortfall at demand node i.
The Max-Min problem formulation is as follows:
Maximize Minimize E r. y t ( 2.9
)
Y € r i e id














ij * "yC 1 " V v (*J) , I
^ > V (/,/)
y,
+
> V (i e /J
y," ^o v (/ e id)
where r = {yijt \ ytjl e (0,1) V (/J) , / ,and E e ? < £, V / }
('J)
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Let a, be the dual variable associated with the flow conservation constraint and* /L)*
the capacity constraint. Converting the minimization LP into its dual, we have:




+ EE M .(l - ?-,) 0.., (2.10)
y € r «€/, ' * /„ ' ('.;')
Subject to «, - a. + Sfy <
a, <
-a, < r.
V (I £ /
5 )
a. unrestricted V !'«(/,, y
r = { 7* I 7 y/ £ (0,1) V (/,/) , / , E e y < £, V / }
The model can be linearized by replacing (1-7,^)/?^ with h ljt and adding the
constraint h^ < $l}l - 7y/£-/ / where jg^ is a lower bound on ^y7 . Looking back at (2.8),
since $l}l is the dual variable for constraint x» < uA 1 -IJ) , it can be interpreted
as the rate of change of the objective function value if an arc is interdicted. Since $i}l
is negative and the maximum rate of change in the objective function value of (2.8)
is max r, , it follows that B > -max r- .
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I c Id I (ij)
Subject to
a. - a + E fl.., < V (/,/)
7 yV 6 (0,1) V (ij) ,1
a, < V (i £ /,)
"«i * ', V (/ £ /J











3. Model 6 - Network with Undirected Arcs
For undirected graph, we can apply a transformation similar to the previous
sections to the network, and the formulation is as follows:













+ E fy < V [/,/]
ijl - h + V* < V [ij] , l
<E, V /
**
e (0,1) V [ij] , /
a
«









unrestricted v / * [J, , /J
'*
< v [/J] , /
*» < V [ij] , /
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III. DETERMINISTIC MODELS - MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS
A military logistics supply problem usually involves the expeditious shipment
of certain distinct commodities, such as ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food and etc,
from the supply depots and ammo dumps to their respective destinations along the
arcs of an underlying transportation network. This scenario results in the well-
known multicommodity flow problem. It also occurs in communication systems,
urban traffic systems and railway problems, as well as in many others. The
commodities interact when flowing on the same arc either by competing for arc
capacity, or by causing congestion.
A. MINIMIZE MAXIMUM FLOW
1. Problem Statement
In this operational setting, the problem of the strategic strike planners can be
stated as follows:
The enemy has a policy of forcing through the unbroken arcs of the network
the flow of a range of commodities. Commodity k flows from source node sk
to a sink node tk. The aim of the interdictor is to reduce the sum of the
maximum flow of the multiple commodities utilizing a fixed amount of
resources and, if given sufficient resources, to stem the flow of materials with
minimum resource and mission turnaround time.
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2. Model 7 - Network with Directed Arcs.
For the multicommodity network model, the following notation is used:
i,j : the index sets for the nodes of the network,
k : the index set for the commodity,
/ : the index set for the types of strike resources.
The given data for the model are:
Ujj : the combined capacity per unit time in a standard unit for the arc
(W-
The variables in the models are:
fk : the amount of flow for commodity k through the network,
X;jk : the amount of flow for commodity k in arc (/,/);
7,y, : the binary variable which is 1 if arc (/,/) is destroyed by strike
resource type /, and is otherwise 0.
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The formulation of the interdiction problem from the attacker's viewpoint is as
follows:





ijk E Xjik =
^ x
,jk * u,j( l - iiji)
*m >- o
if i = sk
if i f sk , sk V k
if i = tk




Let o^. be the dual variable associated with the flow conservation equations, and
let fay be the dual variable associated with the combined capacity constraints. By
taking the dual of the maximization problem the Min-Max problem becomes:










<** = 1 V k
a
*
- % + £ ^ * o V (ij) , , k




unrestricted V i , k
r = (T* I liji v («J) . / . and E e 7 < £, V /}
The above model can be linearized by replacing /^(l - 7^) with h»x and
introducing an additional constraint:




is a known upper bound on /JyV ; and a suitable value is 7^ = 1. In the
multicommodity flow problem, not all dual variables of the maximum flow problem
need to be or 1. There is no guarantee that the optimum solution will be integer
(unless we have a completely planar network, Sakarovitch 1966).
34
The full model is:
Minimize E E uJim (3.3)
Subject to









+ h^Hl > v (/,/) , /
<£, V /
** e (0, 1) v (/,/) , /
'*
> v (/,/) , /







3. Model 8 - Network with Undirected Arcs.
In the undirected-arc multicommodity flow problem, the material can flow in
either direction of an arc so that the total flow is limited by the sum of flows of
different commodities in both directions. An undirected arc in this type of network
can be modeled by two anti-parallel directed arcs with a joint capacity constraint.
Flows of same commodity in opposite direction will cancel, while flows of different
commodities are cumulative regardless of direction. The arc capacity constraint for
undirected arc [/,// is then:
£ ( *ijk + xjik ) * uij v k
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The Min-Max problem from the attacker's viewpoint is:




** Xijk ^ Xjik ~
i i
h if i = s,
if i f s,,t. v k
if i = t,.





r = ( Y« I 7* e (0,1) V [/,/] , / , and E c 7 < £„ V / }
I'J]
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Let an undirected arc be denoted by [/,;]. Following the same methodology for
the development of Model 6, the formulation for the undirected-arc multicommodity
network problem becomes:






= 1 V k
a* - % + Efi9 > V [/,/] , k
*/*
I
> o V [ij]
,
k





lijl e (0, 1) V [ij] , I
h > V [ij] , /
h > V [ij)J
«ft unrestricted V i ,k
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B. MINIMIZE INTERDICTION EFFORT
1. Problem Statement
The attacker has sufficient resources to completely stop the flow of multiple
commodities through the supply network. The aim of the attacker is to create with
the minimum resource and minimum mission turnaround time a disconnecting set
which is defined as a set of arcs whose removal from the network destroys all paths
from each source to its respective sink .
2. Model 9 - Network with Directed Arcs
To solve the above problem, we need to introduce the following modifications
to Model 6 in (3.3):
a. since there are now sufficient resources and we assume that we have
solved Model 6, all h^ terms in the objective function will be zero indicating
zero flow in the network. All h^ terms may then be deleted from the model,
b. the objective function of the new model should now be the amount of
total resources weighted by the factor iv
(;/
which is the measure of the
turnaround time for mission of type / on arc (/,/).
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The model is as follows:






+ «* = 1
















3. Model 10 - Network with Undirected Arcs
For the undirected graph, the formulation becomes:
Minimize E E w
ijt
e
ijt i ij} (3.7)
Subject to
('J)
fy St o V [/,/] , /
liji c (0,1) V[/J] ,/





In this chapter, we will present probabilistic models for network interdiction.
The models to be presented are applicable to infiltration and counterinsurgency
situation.
A. ONE EVADER VERSUS ONE INTERDICTOR
1. Problem Statement
An evader attempts to travel from the source node s of a supply network
to the sink node /. An interdictor would like to stop his opponent by positioning with
probability 7T- on arc (/,/) so that the probability of successful infiltration by the
evader is minimized. The probability that the interdictor detects the evader given
that the interdictor positions himself on arc (/,/) and the evader traverses on arc (/,/)
is Pjj. (If detection is certain, pfj could, instead, represent a reward for catching the
evader on arc (/,/).) Knowing the interdictor's strategy, the evader will have to
develop an optimum strategy by selecting path k with probability 8k so as to minimize
the probability of interception.
2. Model
For this model, the indices used are:
i,j : nodes,
The data of the model are:
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ptj : probability of successful interception given that the evader has chosen
to cross the arc and the interdictor has placed himself there.
The decision variables are:
*« : the probability of the interdictor deploying at arc (/,;'),
(f>tj : the probability of the evader traversing arc (/,;').
The Min-Max formulation is as follows:








1 if i = s
E# - s *f - if i f s or t
; j





The aim of the interdictor is to maximize the total reward while the aim of the
evader is to minimize the total reward. The first constraint of (4.1) ensures that the
probability of deployment by the interdictor is one. The second set of constraints
ensure that only one evader is traversing the network. Let v be the dual variable
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if i = s
if i t s or t
if i = t
v (/,;)
v unrestricted
The optimal solution will occur for that value of v such that the minimum cut
capacity ( with arc capacities at v/p* ) is 1. The dual prices of the first set of
constraints in the optimum solution will be the optimum values of 7^ and are positive




1 if path k contains arc (i,j)
otherwise
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and Sk be the probability that the evader chooses path k.
(2) Having known the optimal values of 0^ by solving (4.2), Sk can be
determined by solving the following set of equations:
As Lawler 1976 points out, there exists a solution of such a system with at most
lEl positive 8k . In fact, a set of lEl or fewer arcs which will satisfy this system can
be derived as follows: Start with the optimal "flow of probability" in the system from
(4.2). Discard any arcs with zero flow. Find a directed path k2 from s to t and
suppose the minimum flow arc on that arc has flow xv Then, associated with this
path kj, S M = x x . Subtract x2 units of flow from arcs along the path and delete any
arcs with no flow remaining. Repeat this process at most l£l - 1 more times until
all flow has been allocated to at most l£l paths.
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B. ONE EVADER VERSUS MULTIPLE INTERDICTORS
1. Problem Statement
A team of n interdictors is deployed in the network in an attempt to stop an
evader from traversing from the source node to the sink node. The evader has the
probability <j>
tj of choosing to travel on arc (/,/). At arc (/,/), at most one interceptor
/ may be deployed, with the probability of n^. The reward to an interdictor of
deploying at arc (/,/) given that the evader has chosen to traverse that arc is p i} . The
objective of the interdictor team is to maximize the total reward while that of the
evader is to minimize it.
2. Model
In this model, the additional index used is:
/ : interdictor number which is l..ji,
The additional decision variables are:
7Ty7 : the probability of interdictor / deploying at arc (/,/),
Sty : the binary variable which is 1 if interdictor / is deployed at arc (/,/)
and is otherwise 0.
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The Max-Min formulation is as follows:
Maximize Minimize E p { 0- -(En.-,) (4.3)
Subject To











E « < 1
E 7T < 1
H >- °
*p« (0,1)
if i - s
if i t s or t




The objective of the interdictor is to manipulate Jty and 8^ so that the total
reward would be maximized. The evader aims to minimize this reward, manipulating
0y. The objective function is correct since, at any one time, only one interdictor
would be present at an arc. This is so due to the second and third constraints of
(4.3). This formulation does restrict the interdictors in that if interdictor / ever
interdicts arc (/,/), no other interdictor /' = / can ever interdict that arc.
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Taking the dual of the minimization LP of the above Max-Min problem and













E « < 1














In this chapter, a network interdictor's problem which originally motivated the
writing of this thesis is solved. GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System)
programs are developed and run on an Amdahl 5990 mainframe computer. The
integer programs are solved using ZOOM (Zero/One Optimization Methods) which
is available in GAMS. The network to be solved is an undirected network, and the
relevant models tested are:
a. Model 2 - minimize the maximum flow (single commodity ),
b. Model 4 - minimize the interdiction effort (single commodity),
c. Model 8 - minimize the maximum flow (multicommodity),
d. Model 10 - minimize the interdiction effort (multicommodity).
A. SCENARIO
The road transportation network in question is as shown in Figure 1. It is a
land transportation network system found in Southeast Asia and consists of 1 12 nodes
and 176 undirected arcs. The capacities of the arcs in term of standard truck-loads
per day as shown in Table 1 which is in Appendix A. The land transportation
network in question presents itself as a realistic scenario for a strategic strike planner
to solve. The locations of enemy front-line units, its supply depots and the
orientation of the network are as shown in Figure 1.
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1. Opposing Forces
The network interdictor has at his disposal the following types of assets:
a. Ground Attack Fighter Squadrons . Fighter aircraft laden with
weapons such as laser-guided bombs and other precision guided munitions
which are suitable for destructions of bridges.
b. Naval Gunfire Support . Naval combatants can be deployed along the
coasts to provide gun fire support.
c. Special Forces. This consists of highly specialized and trained
personnel operating autonomously in small teams deep in enemy's
territories to carry out clandestine sabotage missions.
2. Weapons Efforts
Against a particular target, the suitability of a weapon system and the required
efforts depend on:
a. the types of defenses which the attacker is expected to encounter,
b. the effective range of the weapon,
c. in the case of aerial attacks, the degree of difficulty in
detecting and identifying targets, and,
d. the size of target.
The resources required to destroy each target is given in Table 1. The data
presented represent a realistic range of possibilities but are hypothetical and only
meant for the purpose of testing the model. Accurate resource data could be
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obtained from detailed mission planning for each target with the aid of the Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM), 1991.
B. MINIMUM CUT-SET - SINGLE COMMODITY NETWORK
In this scenario, the enemy wishes to supply his front-line troops at nodes [108]
through [112] by forcing the flow of a single commodity from the supply depots at
nodes [1] through [7] through the network. The maximum flow of the un-interdicted
network is 190 units and the minimum cut-set is as shown in Figure 2.
C. MODEL 2 - MINIMIZING MAXIMUM FLOW - SINGLE COMMODITY
NETWORK
For this model, the GAMS program that solves the problem is in the Appendix.
Given that the interdictor has 4 aircraft, 4 naval gunfire support (NGFS) units and
4 teams of special forces with which to interdict the network, the maximum flow is
reduced to 20 units. The arcs to be interdicted and the force allocation are as
follows:
Arcs Weapons Allocation
1. (84,85) 2 Aircraft
2. (83,86) 4 NGFS
3. (54,87) 2 Aircraft
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Arcs Weapons Allocation
4. (53,52) 2 Special Forces
5. (51,94) 2 Special forces
The cut-set is as shown in Figure 3. In this cut-set, arc (50,52) is the only arc
not interdicted, and allows a flow of 20 units. The model contains 356 single
equations, 817 real variables and 528 discrete variables. The generation time and
execution times are 1.58 seconds and 1.66 seconds respectively. The generation time
is the time spent preparing the model for solution, while the execution time is the
time used after the syntactic check is finished, including the time spent generating the
model.
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D. MODEL 4 - MINIMIZE INTERDICTION EFFORT - SINGLE COMMODITY
NETWORK
Given that the interdictor has sufficient resources to stop completely the flow
of material in the supply network, and, for simplicity, assuming equal turnaround
times, the minimum effort required and the force allocation are as follows:
Arcs Weapons Allocation
1. (84,85) 2 Aircraft
2. (83,86) 2 Aircraft
3. (54,87) 2 Aircraft
4. (52,82) 4 Special Forces
5. (51,94) 2 Special Forces
Figure 4 shows the location of strikes and the force allocation. The model has 356
equations, 641 real variables and 628 discrete variables. It takes 1.59 seconds to
generate and 1.66 seconds to execute the model.
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E. MODEL 8 - MINIMIZE MAXIMUM FLOW - MULTICOMMODITY
NETWORK
For the multicommodity flow scenario, we assume that the enemy wishes to
supply:
1. the unit at node [112] with water from the water "source" at node [90],
2. the unit at node [108] with ammunition from the ammunition dump at
node [6],
3. the unit at node [112] with fuel from the fuel depot at node [5].
The maximum multicommodity flow is 260 units which is the sum of flow of the
three commodities in terms of standard truckloads per day. With the available assets
of 4 aircraft, 4 NGFS units and 4 teams of special forces, the maximum flow is
reduced to 100 units. Figure 5 shows the locations of attack and the following force
allocation:
Arcs Weapons Allocation
1. (51,94) 2 Special Forces
2. (54,55) 2 Aircraft
3. (54,83) 2 Aircraft
4. (83,86) 4 NGFS
5. (84,85) 2 Special Forces
54
Note that the unit at node [112] will receive 80 units of water supply and 20 units of
fuel and ammunition will flow through the network. The model has 1588 equations,
1921 real variables and 528 discrete variables. It takes 6.01 seconds to generate and
6.11 second to execute the model.
F. MODEL 10 - MINIMIZE INTERDICTION EFFORT - MULTICOMMODITY
NETWORK
To disconnect all the units concerned from their respective sources of supply,
the minimum interdiction effort is 14 units and the force allocation is as follows:
Arcs Weapons Allocation
1. (5,12) 4 Aircraft
2. (6,9) 2 Aircraft
3. (97,112) 8NGFS
As shown in Figure 6, the interdiction efforts are channelled to the arcs incident to
the fuel depot, ammunition dumps and the tactical unit requiring water supply. If the
enemy augments the defenses of these arcs by increasing their destruction efforts e^
to an extent that it is no longer possible for the attacker to strike these arcs ( in this
example, we make e^ > E
t
for these three arcs), we will see a distinct shift in the
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attacker's strategy. Figure 7 shows the new strategy adopted by the attackers. The
reallocation of the strike resources is as follows:
Arcs Weapons Allocation
1. (84,85) 2 Aircraft
2. (83,86) 2 Aircraft
3. (54,87) 2 Aircraft
4. (52,94) 4 Special Forces
5. (51,94) 2 Special Forces
6. (90,89) 4NGFS
7. (90,91) 4 Aircraft
The model has 1588 single equations, 1393 real variables and 528 discrete
























































































VI. SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS
A. SUMMARY
In this report, we present two main types of model, vis., the deterministic and
probabilistic models, for the analysis of strategic strike against a land communication
network.
In the deterministic models, the technique of mixed integer programming is
used and has been shown to be quite versatile in that generalizations to include,
among other features, multiple strike resources, are easy. Under this category, the
main models we have developed are:
a. Single Commodity Network . The aim of the network interdictor is to
minimize the maximum throughput of material supply by allocating a fixed
amount of multiple resources to interdict the most "profitable" arcs of the
underlying transportation network. If there are sufficient resources to stop
completely the flow of materials, the problem becomes one of allocating, in an
optimal manner, the minimum effort over the multiple strike resources.
Another way of degrading the performance of the supply network is to
maximize the prioritized shortfalls of the demands at the tactical units.
b. Multicommodity Network . In this situation, the enemy wishes to send a
few types of commodities from their supply depots to the respective tactical
units requiring specialized support. The attacker's problem is either to
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minimize the sum of the maximum flow of the multiple commodities or to
utilize minimum resources to achieve a disconnecting set, which severs the
paths connecting all sources to their respective sinks.
Another type of model presented is a probabilistic model, which is applicable
to the interdiction of a lightly travelled network in which the arc capacity is not a
factor. The objective of a single interdictor or a team of interdictors is to minimize
the probability of infiltration by a single evader through a network while the
objective of the evader is just the opposite.
B. EXTENSIONS
There are a few useful model extensions which warrant further research.
1. Deterministic Models
a. Partial Arc Destruction . One possible model extension would be to allow
for partial arc destruction, by assuming a linear or piece-wise linear damage
function.
b. Co-ordinated Strikes . Certain missions may require the co-ordinated
execution of a few types of strike resources. Examples include the employment
of ground laser designator to illuminate targets for fighter bombers, and target




a. Multiple Evaders Versus Multiple Interceptors . It will be useful to extend
the model to include the situation where multiple interceptors are available to
defend the network against multiple evaders.
b. Resource Constraint . The issue of resource constraint over time can be
addressed to improve model realism.
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APPENDIX A. NETWORK DATA
Arc Capacity Weapons Efforts
Aircraft NGFS Sp Forces
1. (1,20) 100 12 10 15
2. (2,20) 40 14 8 15
3. (3,19) 100 14 10 15
4. (4,14) 110 6 12 15
5. (5,12) 80 4 9 15
6. (6,9) 130 2 15 15
7. (7,8) 30 12 6 15
8. (8,43) 50 10 6 15
9. (8,41) 160 14 18 15
10. (8,9) 140 12 15 15
11. (9,41) 100 16 15 15
12. (9,40) 100 18 15 15
13. (9,10) 80 12 9 15
14. (10,11) 90 16 10 15
15. (11,37) 100 14 12 15
16. (11,12) 50 16 28 15
17. (12,36) 50 4 29 2
18. (12,13) 40 6 24 4
19. (13,33) 80 4 28 4
20. (13,31) 100 8 22 5
21. (13,14) 20 4 23 15
22. (14,15) 40 4 25 15
23. (15,31) 50 4 28 15
24. (15,30) 50 2 28 15
25. (15,28) 60 4 6 15
26. (15,16) 70 6 9 2
27. (16,23) 130 4 14 5
28. (16,17) 120 6 15 4
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Arc Capacity Weapons Efforts
Aircraft NGFS Sp Forces
29. (17,23) 120 2 18 4
30. (17,22) 110 6 18 4
31. (17,18) 120 16 18 4
32. (18,19) 120 10 14 4
33. (19,22) 30 10 4 2
34. (19,20) 50 18 8 2
35. (20,21) 130 14 18 4
36. (21,22) 40 12 8 2
37. (21,24) 50 14 8 2
38. (22,23) 40 12 8 2
39. (23,28) 80 6 8 2
40. (23,26) 70 4 8 2
41. (23,24) 90 6 12 4
42. (24,25) 50 6 8 2
43. (25,26) 60 6 8 2
44. (25,27) 130 6 18 5
45. (25,68) 20 6 4 2
46. (26,27) 50 6 4 2
47. (27,28) 60 6 8 2
48. (27,62) 40 6 6 2
49. (27,66) 90 4 10 6
50. (28,29) 50 4 5 15
51. (29,61) 70 4 27 15
52. (29,30) 50 6 25 15
53. (30,61) 60 4 26 15
54. (30,60) 70 8 28 15
55. (30,31) 100 4 22 15
56. (31,32) 120 4 24 15
57. (32,33) 150 4 26 15
58. (33,60) 140 4 24 15
59. (33,34) 60 4 29 6
60. (34,38) 20 8' 23 2
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Arc Capacity Weapons Efforts
Aircraft NGFS Sp Forces
61. (34,35) 140 4 28 8
62. (35,36) 160 2 20 8
63. (35,37) 30 4 26 2
64. (38,60) 60 6 27 2
65. (38,57) 40 4 28 2
66. (38,39) 20 2 4 2
67. (39,45) 80 2 9 4
68. (39,40) 90 2 10 6
69. (41,42) 40 2 6 2
70. (42,44) 90 2 10 5
71. (42,43) 60 2 6 2
72. (43,47) 30 2 4 2
73. (44,45) 140 12 13 15
74. (44,46) 160 10 15 15
75. (46,47) 180 16 16 15
76. (47,48) 130 10 14 15
77. (48,49) 140 14 15 15
78. (49,50) 30 16 4 15
79. (49,51) 150 18 20 15
80. (51,94) 50 18 8 2
81. (50,52) 20 18 4 2
82. (52,94) 90 12 10 4
83. (52,53) 30 12 25 2
84. (53,54) 50 12 26 2
85. (54,87) 30 2 24 2
86. (54,83) 70 2 28 4
87. (54,55) 30 2 24 2
88. (55,81) 150 4 25 8
89. (55,82) 140 4 25 6
90. (55,56) 30 2 24 2
91. (56,82) 70 4 27 2
92. (56,73) 80 2 20 4
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Arc Capacity Weapons Efforts
Aircraft NGFS Sp Forces
93. (56,57) 90 6 22 5
94. (57,72) 40 6 26 2
95. (57,59) 30 6 24 2
96. (57,58) 60 6 26 2
97. (58,59) 50 4 26 2
98. (59,61) 150 2 20 15
99. (59,62) 140 6 28 15
100. (60,61) 20 4 24 15
101. (62,63) 70 18 8 5
102. (62,64) 90 14 10 5
103. (63,71) 40 14 6 5
104. (63,64) 30 14 5 2
105. (64,70) 80 10 8 5
106. (64,65) 80 10 8 5
107. (65,70) 50 10 6 2
108. (65,67) 40 14 4 2
109. (65,66) 10 18 4 2
110. (66,67) 120 14 10 8
111. (67,68) 130 14 10 15
112. (67,69) 60 14 6 15
113. (69,76) 70 18 8 15
114. (69,70) 40 16 5 15
115. (70,71) 60 14 8 15
116. (71,76) 70 18 8 15
117. (71,72) 80 16 8 15
118. (72,75) 40 14 4 15
119. (72,73) 140 18 18 15
120. (73,74) 150 14 18 15
121. (74,79) 120 16 18 15
122. (74,76) 60 16 8 15
123. (74,75) 30 16 8 15
124. (75,76) 20 14 4 15
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Arc Capacity Weapons Efforts
Aircraft NGFS Sp Forces
125. (76,78) 50 14 5 15
126. (76,77) 30 14 4 15
127. (77,78) 80 12 8 15
128. (77,80) 50 12 6 15
129. (78,79) 30 12 5 15
130. (79,81) 140 14 18 15
131. (79,80) 90 12 10 5
132. (80,81) 30 14 4 2
133. (80,83) 40 10 4 3
134. (80,84) 50 12 8 2
135. (81,83) 50 2 8 2
136. (81,82) 60 2 8 5
137. (83,86) 30 2 4 2
138. (83,84) 90 2 10 6
139. (84,85) 80 2 8 2
140. (85,106) 40 4 8 15
141. (85,86) 70 4 8 15
142. (86,89) 10 8 4 15
143. (86,87) 160 8 20 15
144. (87,88) 180 6 24 15
145. (88,89) 40 6 4 15
146. (89,103) 30 4 4 15
147. (89,100) 90 2 13 15
148. (89,90) 40 6 4 15
149. (90,91) 60 4 5 15
150. (91,99) 90 18 11 15
151. (91,98) 60 16 5 15
152. (91,97) 40 14 4 15
153. (91,96) 140 14 12 15
154. (91,92) 150 10 12 15
155. (92,93) 150 10 12 15
156. (93,96) 30 14 4 15
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Arc Capacity Weapons Efforts
Aircraft NGFS Sp Forces
157. (93,94) 40 12 4 15
158. (94,95) 80 12 8 15
159. (95,97) 90 12 10 15
160. (95,96) 90 12 10 15
161. (98,99) 80 14 8 15
162. (99,101) 90 12 10 15
163. (99,102) 80 12 8 15
164. (99,100) 60 12 6 15
165. (102,103) 50 12 6 15
166. (103,107) 90 12 10 15
167. (103,104) 150 10 14 15
168. (104,107) 120 10 12 15
169. (104,105) 130 16 12 16
170. (104,106) 50 10 8 14
171. (105,106) 80 10 8 14
172. (106,108) 100 14 10 15
173. (107,109) 90 14 8 14
174. (101,110) 100 12 10 16
175. (91,111) 100 12 10 16
176. (97,112) 80 12 8 14
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10 LIMCOL = 0, LIMROW = 0, SOLPRINT = OFF , DECIMALS = 2
11 RESLIM =10000, ITERLIM = 90000, OPTCR = 0.05;
12
13 * DEFINITIONS AND DATA
14
15 SET
16 I nodes in the network /1*112/




21 PARAMETERS CAP(IJ) arc capacity
22
23 /l .20 100
24 2 .20 40
25 3 .19 100
26 4 .14 110
27 5 .12 80
28 6 .9 130
29 7 .8 30
30 8 .43 50
31 8 .41 160
32 8 .9 140
33 9 .41 100
34 9 .40 100
35 9 .10 80
36 10 .11 90
37 11 .37 100




41 13 .33 80
42 13 .31 100
43 13 .14 20
44 14 .15 40
45 15 .31 50
46 15 .30 50
47 15 .28 60
48 15 .16 70
49 16.23 130




54 18 .19 120
55 19 .22 30
56 19.20 50
57 20.21 130
58 21 .22 40
59 21 .24 50
60 22 .23 40
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61 23 .28 80
62 23 .26 70
63 23 .24 90
64 24 .25 50
65 25 .26 60
66 25 .27 130













78 31 .32 120
79 32.33 150
80 33 .60 140
81 33 .34 60
82 34.38 20
83 34.35 140
84 35 .36 160






91 41 .42 40
92 42.44 90
93 42 .43 60
94 43 .47 30
95 44 .45 140
96 44 .46 160
97 46 .47 180
98 47.48 130
99 48 .49 140
100 49 .50 30
101 49 .51 150




106 53 .54 50
107 54 .87 30
108 54.83 70
109 54.55 30
110 55 .81 150
111 55 .82 140
112 55 .56 30
113 56 .82 70
114 56.73 80
115 56.57 90






118 57 .58 60
119 58.59 50





125 63 .71 40
126 63 .64 30
127 64 .70 80
128 64 .65 80
129 65 .70 50
130 65 .67 40
131 65 .66 10
132 66.67 120
133 67 .68 130




138 71 .76 70
139 71 .72 80
140 72 .75 40
141 72 .73 140
142 73 .74 150
143 74.79 120
144 74 .76 60
145 74.75 30
146 75 .76 20
147 76 .78 50
148 76.77 30
149 77 .78 80
150 77.80 50
151 78.79 30






157 81 .83 50
158 81 .82 60
159 83 .86 30
160 83 .84 90
161 84 .85 80
162 85 .106 40
163 85 .86 70
164 86.89 10
165 86 .87 160
166 87.88 180
167 88 .89 40
168 89 .103 30
169 89 .100 90
170 89 .90 40
171 90.91 60
172 91 .99 90
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173 91 .98 60
174 91 .97 40
175 91 .96 140
176 91 .92 150
177 92.93 150
178 93 .96 30
179 93 .94 40
180 94.95 80
181 95 .97 90
182 95 .96 90
183 98.99 80
184 99 .101 90
185 99 .102 80













197 91 .111 IOC)






1 1 .20 .AIR 12, 1 .20 .NGS 10, 1 .20 .SF 15
203 2 .20 .AIR 14, 2 .20 .NGS 8, 2 .20 .SF 15
204 3 .19 .AIR 14, 3 .19 .NGS 10, 3 .19 .SF 15
205 4 .14 .AIR 6, 4 .14 .NGS 12, 4 .14 .SF 15
206 5 .12 .AIR 4, 5 .12 .NGS 9, 5 .12 .SF 15
207 6 .9 .AIR 2, 6 .9 .NGS 15, 6 .9 .SF 15
208 7 .8 .AIR 12, 7 .8 .NGS 6, 7 .8 .SF 15
209 8 .43 .AIR 10, 8 .43 .NGS 6, 8 .43 .SF 15
210 8 .41 .AIR 14, 8 .41 .NGS 18, 8 .41 .SF 15
211 8 .9 .AIR 12, 8 .9 .NGS 15, 8 .9 .SF 15
212 9 .41 .AIR 16, 9 .41 .NGS 15, 9 .41 .SF 15
213 9 .40 .AIR 18, 9 .40 .NGS 15, 9 .40 .SF 15
214 9 .10 .AIR 12, 9 .10 .NGS 9, 9 .10 .SF 15
215 10 .11 .AIR 16, 10 .11 .NGS 10, 10 .11 .SF 15
216 11 .37 .AIR 14, 11 .37 .NGS 12, 11 .37 .SF 15
217 11 .12 .AIR 16, 11 .12 .NGS 28, 11 .12 .SF 15
218 12 .36 .AIR 4, 12 .36 .NGS 29, 12 .36 .SF 2
219 12 .13 .AIR 6, 12 .13 .NGS 24, 12 .13 .SF 4
220 13 .33 .AIR 4, 13 .33 .NGS 28, 13 .33 .SF 4
221 13 .31 .AIR 8, 13 .31 .NGS 22, 13 .31 .SF 5
222 13 .14 .AIR 4, 13 .14 .NGS 23, 13 .14 .SF 15
223 14 .15 .AIR 4, 14 .15 .NGS 25, 14 .15 .SF 15
224 15 .31 .AIR 4, 15 .31 .NGS 28, 15 .31 .SF 15
225 15 .30 .AIR 2, 15 .30 .NGS 28, 15 .30 .SF 15
226 15 .28 .AIR 4, 15 .28 .NGS 6, 15 .28 .SF 15
227 15 .16 .AIR 6, 15 .16 .NGS 9, 15 .16 .SF 2
228 16 .23 .AIR 4, 16 .23 .NGS 14, 16 .23 .SF 5
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273 43 .47 .AIR 2, 43 .47 .NGS 4, 43 .47 .SF 2
274 44 .45 .AIR 12, 44 .45 .NGS 13, 44 .45 .SF 15
275 44 .46 .AIR 10, 44 .46 .NGS 15, 44 .46 .SF 15
276 46 .47 .AIR 16, 46 .47 .NGS 16, 46 .47 .SF 15
277 47 .48 .AIR 10, 47 .48 .NGS 14, 47 .48 .SF 15
278 48 .49 .AIR 14, 48 .49 .NGS 15, 48 .49 .SF 15
279 49 .50 .AIR 16, 49 .50 .NGS 4, 49 .50 .SF 15
280 49 .51 .AIR 18, 49 .51 .NGS 20, 49 .51 .SF 15
281 51 .94 .AIR 18, 51 .94 .NGS 8, 51 .94 .SF 2
282 50 .52 .AIR 18, 50 .52 .NGS 4, 50 .52 .SF 2
283 52 .94 .AIR 12, 52 .94 .NGS 10, 52 .94 .SF 4
284 52 .53 .AIR 12, 52 .53 .NGS 25, 52 .53 .SF 2


































































































































































































































310 65 .66 .AIR 18, 65 .66 .NGS 4, 65 .66 .SF 2
311 66 .67 .AIR 14, 66 .67 .NGS 10, 66 .67 .SF 8
312 67 .68 .AIR 14, 67 .68 .NGS 10, 67 .68 .SF 15
313 67 .69 .AIR 14, 67 .69 .NGS 6, 67 .69 .SF 15
314 69 .76 .AIR 18, 69 .76 .NGS 8, 69 .76 .SF 15
315 69 .70 .AIR 16, 69 .70 .NGS 5, 69 .70 .SF 15
316 70 .71 .AIR 14, 70 .71 .NGS 8, 70 .71 .SF 15
317 71 .76 .AIR 18, 71 .76 .NGS 8, 71 .76 .SF 15
318 71 .72 .AIR 16, 71 .72 .NGS 8, 71 .72 .SF 15
319 72 .75 .AIR 14, 72 .75 .NGS 4, 72 .75 .SF 15
320 72 .73 .AIR 18, 72 .73 .NGS 18, 72 .73 .SF 15
321 73 .74 .AIR 14, 73 .74 .NGS 18, 73 .74 .SF 15
322 74 .79 .AIR 16, 74 .79 .NGS 18, 74 .79 .SF 15
323 74 .76 .AIR 16, 74 .76 .NGS 8, 74 .76 .SF 15
324 74 .75 .AIR 16, 74 .75 .NGS 8, 74 .75 .SF 15
325 75 .76 .AIR 14, 75 .76 .NGS 4, 75 .76 .SF 15
326 76 .78 .AIR 14, 76 .78 .NGS 5, 76 .78 .SF 15
327 76 .77 .AIR 14, 76 .77 .NGS 4, 76 .77 .SF 15
328 77 .78 .AIR 12, 77 .78 .NGS 8, 77 .78 .SF 15
329 77 .80 .AIR 12, 77 .80 .NGS 6, 77 .80 .SF 15
330 78 .79 .AIR 12, 78 .79 .NGS 5, 78 .79 .SF 15
331 79 .81 .AIR 14, 79 .81 .NGS 18, 79 .81 .SF 15
332 79 .80 .AIR 12, 79 .80 .NGS 10, 79 .80 .SF 5
333 80 .81 .AIR 14, 80 .81 .NGS 4, 80 .81 .SF 2
334 80 .83 .AIR 10, 80 .83 .NGS 4, 80 .83 .SF 3
335 80 .84 .AIR 12, 80 .84 .NGS 8, 80 .84 .SF 2
336 81 .83 .AIR 2, 81 .83 .NGS 8, 81 .83 .SF 2
337 81 .82 .AIR 2, 81 .82 .NGS 8, 81 .82 .SF 5
338 83 .86 .AIR 2, 83 .86 .NGS 4, 83 .86 .SF 2
339 83 .84 .AIR 2, 83 .84 .NGS 10, 83 .84 .SF 6
340 84 .85 .AIR 2, 84 .85 .NGS 8, 84 .85 .SF 2
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341 85 .106.AIR 4, 85 .106.NGS 8, 85 .106.SF 15
342 85 .86 .AIR 4, 85 .86 .NGS 8, 85 .86 .SF 15
343 86 .89 .AIR 8, 86 .89 .NGS 4, 86 .89 .SF 15
344 86 .87 .AIR 8, 86 .87 .NGS 20, 86 .87 .SF 15
345 87 .88 .AIR 6, 87 .88 .NGS 24, 87 .88 .SF 15
346 88 .89 .AIR 6, 88 .89 .NGS 4, 88 .89 .SF 15
347 89 .103.AIR 4, 89 .103.NGS 4, 89 .103.SF 15
GAMS
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348 89 .100.AIR 2, 89 .100.NGS 13, 89 .100.SF 15
349 89 .90 .AIR 6, 89 .90 .NGS 4, 89 .90 .SF 15
350 90 .91 .AIR 4, 90 .91 .NGS 5, 90 .91 .SF 15
351 91 .99 .AIR 18, 91 .99 .NGS 11, 91 .99 .SF 15
352 91 .98 .AIR 16, 91 .98 .NGS 5, 91 .98 .SF 15
353 91 .97 .AIR 14, 91 .97 .NGS 4, 91 .97 .SF 15
354 91 .96 .AIR 14, 91 .96 .NGS 12, 91 .96 .SF 15
355 91 .92 .AIR 10, 91 .92 .NGS 12, 91 .92 .SF 15
356 92 .93 .AIR 10, 92 .93 .NGS 12, 92 .93 .SF 15
357 93 .96 .AIR 14, 93 .96 .NGS 4, 93 .96 .SF 15
358 93 .94 .AIR 12, 93 .94 .NGS 4, 93 .94 .SF 15
359 94 .95 .AIR 12, 94 .95 .NGS 8, 94 .95 .SF 15
360 95 .97 .AIR 12, 95 .97 .NGS 10, 95 .97 .SF 15
361 95 .96 .AIR 12, 95 .96 .NGS 10, 95 .96 .SF 15
362 98 .99 .AIR 14, 98 .99 .NGS 8, 98 .99 .SF 15
363 99 .101.AIR 12, 99 .101.NGS 10, 99 .101.SF 15
364 99 .102.AIR 12, 99 .102.NGS 8, 99 .102.SF 15
365 99 .100.AIR 12, 99 .100.NGS 6, 99 .100.SF 15
366 102.103.AIR 12, 102.103.NGS 6, 102.103.SF 15
367 103. 107.AIR 12, 103.107.NGS 10, 103.107.SF 15
368 103.104.AIR 10, 103.104.NGS 14, 103.104.SF 15
369 104.107.AIR 10, 104.107.NGS 12, 104.107.SF 15
370 104.105.AIR 16, 104.105.NGS 12, 104.105.SF 16
371 104.106.AIR 10, 104.106.NGS 8, 104.106.SF 14
372 105.106.AIR 10, 105.106.NGS 8, 105.106.SF 14
373 106. 108.AIR 14, 106.108.NGS 10, 106.108.SF 15
374 107.109.AIR 14, 107.109.NGS 8, 107.109.SF 14
375 101.110.AIR 12, 101.110.NGS 10, 101.110.SF 16
376 91 .lll.AIR 12, 91 .lll.NGS 10, 91 .lll.SF 16





































































equation for forward arc
equation for backward arc
weapon expenditure for each arc;
* > > > minimize < < <
OBJ..
MAXCAP =E= SUM ( (I,J) $ ( CAP(I,J) GT ) , CAP(I,J)
H(U));
* > > > subject to < < <
ARCl(IJ) $ ( CAP(IJ) GT 0)..
A(I) - A(J) + H(I,J) + SUM (L, G(I,J,L)) =G= 0;
ARC2(I,J) $ ( CAP(I,J) GT 0)..
A(J) - A(I) + H(I,J) + SUM (L, G(I,J,L)) =G= 0;
WPN(L).
83




431 MODEL NETINT /ALL/;
432 SOLVE NETINT USING MIP MINIMIZING MAXCAP;
433 DISPLAY MAXCAP.L;
434 DISPLAY H.L;
435 OPTION G:0:2:l; DISPLAY G.L;
COMPILATION TIME 0.380 SECONDS
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MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 4 SINGLE EQUATIONS 356
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES 4 SINGLE VARIABLES 817
NON ZERO ELEMENTS 2817 DISCRETE VARIABLES 528
GENERATION TIME 1.550 SECONDS
EXECUTION TIME = 1.630 SECONDS
1
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* * * * OBJECTIVE VALUE 20.0000
RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT 1.162 10000.000
ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT 303 90000
Z O M / X M P — Version 2.1 Jun 1988
Courtesy of Dr Roy E. Marsten,
Department of Management Information Systems,
University of Arizona,
Tucson Arizona 85721, U.S.A.
PROBLEM SPECIFICATIONS
BEGIN
* SPECS FILE, VERSION 2.1 JUN 1987





* PARAMETERS CONTROLLING LP
*


















SOLUTION REPORT SOLVE NETINT USING MIP FROM LINE 432
GAMS 2.19 IBM CMS
END
Work space needed (estimate) -- 55974 words.
Work space available ~ 55974 words.
Maximum obtainable -- 295165 words.
The LU factors occupied 1319 slots (estimate 7388).
Iterations: Initial LP 303, Time: 0.83
Heuristic 0, 0.00
Branch and bound 0, 0.00
Final LP 0, 0.00
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-— 433 VARIABLE MAXCAP.L = 20.00













**** FILE SUMMARY FOR USER 8847P
INPUT SC2 GAMS A
OUTPUT SC2 LISTING A
EXECUTION TIME = 0.270 SECONDS
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